Federal Taxation by Butler, James D.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 52 
Issue 1 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 16 
March 2021 
Federal Taxation 
James D. Butler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
James D. Butler, Federal Taxation, 52 Denv. L.J. 239 (1975). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
FEDERAL TAXATION
In the 1973-1974 term the Tenth Circuit handed down opin-
ions on federal taxation issues as diverse as the definition of
"farmer"' and the requirement that Miranda warnings be given
in the course of Internal Revenue Service criminal investigations.
2
Two opinions, one dealing with the corporate accumulated earn-
ings tax and working capital requirements 3 and the other con-
cerned with collateral estoppel in federal income tax cases,4 have
been selected for extended comment in this section. Issues from
five other opinions are discussed briefly in the following over-
view.5 The only basis for the selection of these issues is that the
author subjectively found them to be interesting.
I. OVERVIEW
A. United States v. Eaves, 499 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974)
When a taxpayer's undivided interest in real property is sub-
jected to a tax lien, most circuits hold that under section 7403 of
the Internal Revenue Code' the court may order foreclosure
against the entire property.7 Only the Fifth Circuit has ruled that
Hi-Plains Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 496 F. 2d 520 (10th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Bettenhausen, 499 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1974).
The Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1974).
Weiszmann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1973).
Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Eaves, 499
F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974); Dakil v. United States, 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1974); Kirtley v. Bickerstaff, 488 F.2d 768
(10th Cir. 1973).
The eight remaining decisions handed down on taxation issues this term are not
discussed at all: United States v. Bettenhausen, 499 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1974); Hi-Plains
Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 520 (10th Cir. 1974); Reardon v. United
States, 491 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1974) (taxpayer entitled to section 105(d) sick pay exclusion
until he reached mandatory retirement age; Treas. Reg. § 1.105-4(a)(3)(i)(a)(1956), inso-
far as it necessitates a contrary result, is invalid); Maytag v. United States, 493 F.2d 995
(10th Cir. 1974) (trust assets properly includible in gross estate where decedent had a
section 2024 general power of appointment over the trust assets at his death); Alpine
Country Club v. United States, 490 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1974) (concerning repealed section
4241 of the Code); Glasgow v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1973) (Tax Court's
determination that undergraduate educational expenses of Baptist minister were deducti-
ble is affirmed); King Radio Corp. v. United States, 486 F.2d 1091 (10th Cir. 1973)
(movable partition system qualifies as "section 38 property" for purposes of the invest-
ment credit); Wallace v. Commissioner, 485 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1973) (taxpayer's pay-
ments to former spouse were lump sum and not periodic payments); Hicks v. United
States, 486 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974) (valuation of close
corporation properly included market rather than book value of certain corporate assets).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7403.
United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
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the government's foreclosure rights are limited to the sale of the
property interest on which the lien has attached.8 The statutory
section clearly states that the court may order a foreclosure sale
on a tax lien, indicating that a district court would be within its
authority in not ordering any foreclosure at all.' In United States
v. Eaves, 0 the Tenth Circuit decided that it was also within the
trial court's discretion to order a sale of only the taxpayer's inter-
est in jointly held property.
The Eaves court first rejected the Folsom v. United States"
rule and, "[t]o the extent necessary in this case,"1 adopted the
majority interpretation of section 7403. It then concluded that the
majority rule states "the limit of authority conferred by section
7403,' ' 13 within which the district court could fashion a remedy
"gear[ed] . . . to the factual situation and legal relationships
• . . to best accomplish the statutory aims and the rights and
equities of the owners."'" In this case the lower court chose an
appropriate remedy in confining the foreclosure sale to the tax-
payer's half-interest in the property.
The Tenth Circuit's result is consistent with both the statu-
tory section involved and precedential inferences. 5 As such it
merits close attention by other courts concerned with the same
issue.
B. Kirtley v. Bickerstaff, 488 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1973)
Section 7421 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides
that, with certain exceptions, "no suit for the purpose of restrain-
ing the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained
(1973); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Trilling,
328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964); see Washington v. United States, 402 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 978 (1971).
Folsom v. United States, 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
The word "may" replaced the word "shall" in the statute in 1936, Revenue Act of
1936, ch. 690, § 802, 49 Stat. 1743-44, indicating a congressional desire that the power to
order a foreclosure sale was to be discretionary rather than mandatory. United States v.
Boyd, 246 F.2d 477, 481 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 889 (1957).
10 499 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
" 499 F.2d at 871.
13 Id.
Id.
United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970) (the court affirmed a sale
of the entire property rather than just the taxpayer's interest, but stated that the district
court should use its discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedy under the statute);
United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1964) ("IThere is no evidence which
suggests any impropriety in the sale of the entire property.").
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in any court by any person . . . ." Section 6013(e) of the Code
relieves an "innocent spouse" from liability for taxes assessed
against the income of both spouses in certain situations where a
joint return is filed." In Kirtley v. Bickerstaf" the Tenth Circuit
rendered the first circuit court decision on the issue of whether
section 6013(e) operates as an exception to the general rule of
section 7421.18 The court held that no exception was created.
The decision seems both legally correct'" and fundamentally
fair. The "innocent spouse" has the options available to every
taxpayer of either filing a petition with the Tax Court to prevent
assessment or collection of any alleged deficiency until a judg-
ment is rendered 0 (unless of course the Commissioner has
grounds for and makes a jeopardy assessment") or paying the
alleged deficiency and suing for a refund.2 No equitable consider-
ation appears which would so separate the innocent spouse from
the average taxpayer against whom a tax is wrongfully assessed
or collected as to entitle the former to greater procedural remedies
than the latter.
C. United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1974)
In United States v. Hodgson 3 the Tenth Circuit quietly
joined the Second" and the Fifth25 Circuits in ruling that the
nature and scope of the attorney-client privilege in federal income
tax matters26 is governed by federal and not state law. Only the
" See the discussion of Dakil v. United States, 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974), text
accompanying notes 40-47, infra.
17 488 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1973).
11 The Sixth Circuit had an opportunity to discuss the issue when the district court
granted a temporary injunction against collection of any tax pending a hearing on the
applicability of section 6013(e). The court remanded the case for a consideration of the
potential conflict between sections 6013(e) and 7421 rather than deciding the issue itself.
Clarke v. District Director of the IRS, 457 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1972).
11 The stringent nature of the injunction-bar rule of section 7421 is underlined by
Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962), cited as authority in
Kirtley v. Bickerstaff, 488 F.2d 768, 769 (10th Cir. 1973). Enochs limited injunctions
against the collection of taxes to situations where both (1) the taxpayer would be irrepara-
bly injured by the collection and (2) the government could not possibly prevail on the
merits. See generally Recent Development, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1502 (1973); Note, 30 WASH..
& LEE L. REv. 573 (1973).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6213(a).
22 Id. § 6861(a).
n Id. § 7422.
U 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1974).
N Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963).
" United States v. Finley, 434 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1970).
" Specifically involved was a summons issued under section 7602 of the 1954 Code.
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Ninth Circuit stands for the opposing rule that state law gov-
erns. 7 The Seventh Circuit has expressly refused to take a stand
on the issue where there was no state statute to turn to even if
state law did govern.m It has been predicted that the Eighth
Circuit will follow the plurality rule if and when an occasion for
its decision on the issue arises.2
The announced policy consideration in favor of the plurality
rule is "the desirability of avoiding inconsistent treatment to fed-
eral taxpayers."0 However, the real issue is not so much whether
uniformity of treatment is preferable to distinctions among tax-
payers of different states, but rather whether the policy favoring
uniform treatment outweighs the policy in favor of a precisely-
delineated privilege. When an attorney represents a client with
respect to both tax and non-tax matters, concepts of what is or
is not privileged should not change with each shift in the nature
of the advice given. Thus the Ninth Circuit rule may be the better
one insofar as it grants clarity of the privilege a higher priority
than national uniformity.
D. Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974)
In United States v. Davis,' the Supreme Court held that a
husband who transferred appreciated property to his wife under
a voluntary pre-divorce property settlement agreement had to
recognize his gain on the exchange. Under the Delaware law appl-
icable in Davis, the wife had only inchoate rights in her husband's
property, 32 and hence the transfer of property under the settle-
ment more closely resembled a taxable transfer of property in
exchange for release of an independent obligation than it did a
nontaxable division of property between co-owners.
3
In Wiles v. Commissioner,U the Tenth Circuit applied the
United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d
623 (9th Cir. 1960).
n Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965).
" United States v. Kansas City Lutheran Home & Hosp. Ass'n, 297 F. Supp. 239
(W.D. Mo. 1969).
Id. at 243.
" 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
32 The wife has no interest-passive or active-over the management or
disposition of her husband's personal property. Her rights are not descenda-
ble, and she must survive him to share in his intestate estate. Upon dissolu-
tion of the marriage she shares in the property only to such extent as the
court deems "reasonable."
Id. at 70.
n Id. at 69-71.
- 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974).
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Davis rule to a property settlement agreement where the marital
rights of the parties were governed by Kansas law. In a well-
reasoned, well-researched opinion the court held that under Kan-
sas law, like Delaware law, the settlement agreement more closely
resembled a transfer of property for release of an independent
obligation than a division of property between co-owners. How-
ever, the court expressly noted the possibility of a different deci-
sion where the rights of the parties were governed by Oklahoma
lawn or by Colorado law.36
The Supreme Court noted in Davis the distinct possibility
that taxpayers in different states would be treated differently
under its ruling, 7 and this observation was echoed in Wiles.3"
Under existing statutory law the decisions seem unassailable. Yet
it is strange that a Congress which has often reached out to elimi-
nate tax discrepancies between community property and com-
mon law jurisdictions39 rests complacent with a rule in which
discrimination is so blatant. A statutory change would seem to
be in order.
E. Dakil v. United States, 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974)
Spouses filing joint returns are normally jointly and severally
liable for the tax due on their joint income."0 In 1971 a Congress
dismayed by the sometimes inequitable results brought about by
this rule" added subsection 6013(e) to the Internal Revenue Code.
The new subsection provided that a spouse could be relieved of
liability for tax due on income omitted from the joint return if
three conditions were met: (1) the omitted income must have
u "The Oklahoma law would seem to be in a state of flux." Id. at 258.
u Especially significant to the court was the Colorado Supreme Court's response to
an inquiry about the nature of marital rights under Colorado law. The Colorado Supreme
Court had stated that vesting of property rights occurs when a dissolution action is filed
and any transfer of property occurring thereafter pursuant to a court-approved, stipulated
property settlement agreement more closely resembles a division of property between co-
owners than a transfer for release of an independent obligation. In re Questions Submitted
by the United States Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974). In the corresponding federal
action, the taxpayer was held not to be required to recognize his gain on the transfer of
appreciated property pursuant to a post-dissolution property settlement. Imel v. United
States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974).
370 U.S. at 70-71.
499 F.2d at 259.
E.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2056(c)(2)(B) (marital estate tax deduction),
2523(f) (marital gift tax deduction).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(d)(3).
,1 See S. REP. No. 91-1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. [U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6089,
6090-91 (1970)].
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been attributable to the other spouse and must have exceeded 25
percent of the reported gross income; (2) the spouse seeking relief
from liability must establish that he or she did not know or have
reason to know of the omission; and (3) the spouse seeking relief
from liability must establish that he or she did not significantly
benefit from the omission, or that it would be inequitable to hold
him or her liable for the deficiency.42
In Dakil v. United States" the Tenth Circuit was faced with
the issue of a spouse's liability or nonliability under section
6013(e). The court stated that "[slection 6013(e)(1) of the Code
relieves a spouse of liability under certain conditions, only one of
which is pertinent here."" The court then went on to find that
either Mrs. Dakil had not significantly benefited from her hus-
band's omissions, or it would be inequitable to hold her liable for
the tax due on them, and hence she was relieved of liability under
section 6013(e)(1). Nowhere does the opinion deal with the 25
percent requirement or the innocent spouse's burden of proof with
respect to knowledge of the omitted income. The court's state-
ment that "only one" of the conditions of subsection 6013(e)(1)
was "pertinent" indicates its belief that these other requirements
were irrelevant.
To the extent the opinion indicates that the three conditions
of subsection 6013(e)(1) are disjunctive rather than conjunctive,
it is clearly incorrect. The statutory language indicates by the use
of "and" between the second and third conditions that the re-
quirements are conjunctive. Both the House and Senate commit-
tee reports on the amendment stated, "[T]he bill provides that
when three conditions exist [not "one of three"], the 'innocent
spouse' is to be relieved of the tax liability . . . ."' In Wissing
v. Commissioner4" the Sixth Circuit found that where only two of
the three conditions were met, the spouse was not entitled to
relief. The Tax Court has expressly held that "[in order to be
relieved from liability . . . petitioner must shoulder the burden
of proving that the three conditions of section 6013(e) are met and
not just one of them."47
I NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(e).
a 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 433.
S. REP. No. 91-1537, supra note 41 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 91-1734, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (empahsis added).
441 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1971).
R. Adams, 60 T.C. 300 (1973).
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Possibly the Tenth Circuit realizes that the conditions are
conjunctive, but it failed to deal with the first two conditions in
Dakil because, perhaps, they were stipulated or clearly proven at
trial. If so, the court's failure to acknowledge the existence and
fulfillment of the other requirements makes the opinion highly
misleading. The court should correct or clarify its view of section
6013(e) at the first opportunity.
James D. Butler
II. ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX-WORKING CAPI-
TAL REQUIREMENTS: A FORMULA APPROACH
The Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner
494 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1974)
Corporations which are "formed or availed of for the purpose
of avoiding the income tax with respect to [their] shareholders
• . .by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate"' rather
than distributing them are subject to a special tax under sections
531 through 537 of the Internal Revenue Code.' The tax imposed
is a percentage of the corporation's "accumulated taxable in-
come," 3 which can be offset in part by any accumulations which
are demonstrably intended for the "reasonable needs of the busi-
ness."' Working capital requirements are expressly stated in the
Treasury Regulations to be reasonable needs of the business.'
In The Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner,' the
petitioner contested the Commissioner's imposition of the section
531 tax on its accumulations. As part of its justification for accu-
mulating earnings, Cheyenne claimed a need for operating work-
ing capital equal to 6-months' worth of operating expenses, or
$620,000. In support of this claim, Cheyenne cited other court
decisions which held operating expense requirements based upon
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 532.
2 Section 531 imposes the tax and sets its rate. Section 532 states which corporations
are subject to the tax. Section 533 provides that allowing income to accumulate "beyond
the reasonable needs of the business" is "determinative" of a purpose to avoid income tax
with respect to shareholders unless the corporation proves to the contrary by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. The burden of proof in section 531 cases is set by section 534; and
the definition of "accumulated taxable income" is contained in section 535. Section 537
defines "reasonable needs of the business."
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 531.
I d. § 535(c)(1).
Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b)(4) (1959).
494 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1974).
1975
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even greater lengths of time to be reasonable. The Tenth Circuit
rejected this contention and held that each business must be
considered in light of its particular needs in order to ascertain
what accumulations for working capital are reasonable for it.'
The working capital of a business, which can be defined as
the amount by which current assets (cash, inventory, receivables,
and securities') exceed current liabilities9 (liabilities which will
become due and payable within one year'0 ), is used to meet the
day-to-day needs of a business. Working capital funds are used
to purchase supplies and inventory and to pay for labor costs and
other operating expenses of a business. While there is agreement
that working capital is a reasonable business need, a prevalent
issue in most section 531 cases is how much working capital the
business should be able to accumulate before it finds itself sub-
ject to the section 531 penalty tax.
Cheyenne offered testimony by an independent newspaper
executive and its own comptroller to substantiate its working
capital claim. Both witnesses testified that an accumulation of 6-
months' working capital was reasonable in light of contingencies
such as mechanical failures, labor strikes, natural disasters,
paper shortages, and Cheyenne's conceivable loss of its second
class mailing permit. The Tenth Circuit in analyzing these con-
tingencies found them to be neither realistic nor reasonable. The
last time Cheyenne had suffered a natural disaster, which then
only curtailed but did not stop operations, was in 1949. The news-
paper operation had not suffered a mechanical breakdown. suffi-
cient to prevent publication in 33 years and had not experienced
a labor strike in 20 years. Finally, the newspaper's asserted fear
of losing its second class mailing permit was held to be un-
founded."
The court held that mere possibilities do not amount to
reasonably-anticipated business needs, and thus it refused to per-
mit justification of 6-months' working capital on the posited hy-
pothetical disasters. The court went on to find that Cheyenne's
true working capital requirements were indicated by two facts:
(1) Cheyenne had to make only insubstantial inventory expendi-
' Id. at 432.
Federal Ornamental Iron & Bronze Co., 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 391 (1969).
W. MEIGS, C. JOHNSON & A. MOSICH, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING (1970).
10 Id.
11 494 F.2d at 433.
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tures; and (2) Cheyenne's accounts receivable turned over rap-
idly.
Cheyenne's only inventory was newsprint, and the cost of a
year's supply represented 15 percent of Cheyenne's yearly operat-
ing cost. However, this fact, standing alone or even in conjunction
with the other findings of the court, reveals little in determining
the amount of working capital required. When properly dis-
counted to its true significance, it is worth very little.
Secondly, Cheyenne's income was primarily derived from
advertising and subscriptions, and most of these accounts were
collected within 30 days. This accounts receivable collection rate
has been a valid factor used by many courts (particularly those
applying the Bardahl test 2 ), and the Tenth Circuit properly
noted its significance. However, other courts that have used this
factor in determining reasonable working capital requirements
have gone further in their analyses than did the Tenth Circuit.
They certainly have not decided cases relying on a simple state-
ment of the existence of this bare fact.
Thus Cheyenne's arguments for accumulations sufficient to
cover anticipated operating expenses for 6 months articulated
only the most speculative reasons for using this time period. Yet
with little more articulation of rationale, the Tax Court and the
Tenth Circuit, "on the basis of all the evidence," concluded that
accumulations for only 3-months operating expenses were allowa-
ble. Baldly stating that an accumulation of 3 months', as opposed
to 6 months', operating expenses is reasonable is as unacceptable
as stating that one year is per se not unreasonable.'" Yet in
Cheyenne the Tenth Circuit rejected that latter formulation and
contemporaneously utilized the former.' 4
When the question of what constitutes a reasonable amount
of working capital has arisen in other circuits in recent years, the
analyses used in resolving the issue have been quite different than
that used by the Tenth Circuit in Cheyenne.
The First Circuiit in Apollo Industries, Inc. v.
" See text accompanying notes 18-28 infra.
" The 1-year rule has been rejected by many courts as no more than a rule of thumb.
See, e.g., Hardin v. United States, 461 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1972); The Shaw-Walker Co. v.
Commissioner, 390 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1968); Coastal Casting Service, Inc. v. Phinney, 70-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9716 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Walton Mill, Inc., 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 75
(1972).
" 494 F.2d at 432-33.
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Commissioner,'5 the Fifth Circuit in Hardin v. United States,'"
and the Sixth Circuit in Shaw- Walker Co. v. Commissioner'7 all
have recognized the importance of making an indepth analysis of
a company's working capital needs before imposing a section 531
tax. The court in Shaw- Walker held it to be reversible error when
the Tax Court failed to make the necessary detailed analysis and
findings of fact relative to the anticipated needs of the taxpayer
for working capital in its normal business operations.
In Apollo, the First Circuit emphasized the need for a partic-
ular analysis of the corporation's working capital requirements:
We do not think that a summary view of the balance sheet, or
of working capital, or even of the amount of net liquid assets can give
a court enough of an appreciation of the real needs of a business for
operating funds. Business decisions are not made on the basis of
information collected at arbitrary dates. They take into account the
timing of needs and availability of resources. And so should judicial
attempts to deal justly with these decisions. But to ascertain such
needs and the resources available, we are required to go behind the
simple balance sheet presentation of assets and liabilities."
In determining what amount of working capital is reasonable
for a business, the above courts have all employed an operating
cycle concept as first enunciated by the Tax Court in Bardahl
Manufacturing Corp. '" The starting point under this approach is
a determination of the amount of net liquid assets available to
meet the reasonable needs of the business, which are considered
for this purpose to be the cost of operating the business during
one complete operating cycle plus appropriate amounts as may
be needed to meet any anticipated nonoperating expenses of the
business.20
An operating cycle of a business may be described as the time
period needed to convert cash into raw materials, raw materials
into finished goods, inventory into sales and accounts receivable,
and accounts receivable back into cash.21 Determination of the
length of an operating cycle for a business is based on the so-
called Bardahl formula. The formula consists of (a) an inventory
turnover period, computed by dividing the annual cost of goods
sold into the peak period (or average) inventory, and (b) an ac-
" 358 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1966).
" 461 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1972).
7 390 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1968).
" 358 F.2d at 871.
1 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 1030 (1965).
Bardahl Int'l Corp., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 935 (1966).
21 Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1030 (1965).
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counts receivable turnover period, computed by dividing the an-
nual sales into the peak period (or average) accounts receivable.
These calculations produce two decimal figures, each represent-
ing part of a year, which when added together yield the average
length of an operating cycle expressed as a decimal part of a
year." This figure is then multiplied by the sum of the corpora-
tion's cost of goods sold and its operating expenses (excluding
noncash expenses such as depreciation) for the year in issue. The
result is the amount of cash needed to cover the reasonably-
anticipated costs of operating the business for a single operating
cycle.23
A comparison of this amount, plus any amounts needed for
other business purposes, with the net liquid assets of the corpora-
tion (i.e., current assets less current liabilities) will indicate
whether or not earnings are being accumulated unreasonably. For
example, if the figure produced by the operating cycle formula,
when added to provisions for other reasonably-anticipated busi-
ness needs, exceeds the net liquid assets of the corporation, then
the section 531 penalty tax may be imposed. If the figure for the
operating cycle plus amounts required for other business needs is
less than net liquid assets, then the corporation can reasonably
accumulate a portion of its annual earnings as working capital.
The formula's use is probably best suited to manufacturing
industries, but its application has been extended to service indus-
tries. When used in service industries a distorted picture of work-
ing capital requirements appears because of the calculation in the
formula for the inventory turnover rate.24 A service industry's
"inventory" and only real asset is its brainpower and the skills it
offers for hire. The lack of any substantial finished goods or raw
materials inventory yields a lower inventory turnover period and
consequently a lower figure for working capital as computed by
the formula than would result from an application of the formula
to a manufacturing concern with comparable working capital
needs.
Although this disparity precludes a rigid application of the
" Id. Some courts have suggested the use of a third element in the formula. This is
the accounts payable turnover period, computed by dividing annual purchases into aver-
age accounts payable. This figure should then be subtracted from the sum of the inventory
and accounts receivable turnover periods in arriving at the operating cycle expressed as a
decimal part of the year. See Bardahl Int'l Corp., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 935 (1966).
2 Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1030 (1965).
24 Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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formula to service industries, its use is not entirely inappropriate.
In Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States5 the district court com-
puted a working capital figure for a professional engineering serv-
ice company by first utilizing the Bardahl formula and then add-
ing to this figure 2-months' salary expense. The court found this
to be necessary and appropriate because of the high fixed costs
of the corporation. In other words, when business was slow, the
operating expenses remained constant as the salaries had to be
paid *2
Although the figures for application of the formula to Chey-
enne are not all available from the facts as reported by the court,
enough information exists to attempt an analysis using the
Bardahl method.
Average Inventory 7
(a) Average Inventory Turnover = Cost of Goods Sold
1965 1966 1967
91,735 .092 .093 30 .093
1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
(b) Average Accounts Receivable Turnover = Average Accounts ReceiSales
25 Id.
SId.
Assuming a decline in business for a quarter or more . . . it would be
foolhardy to have an abrupt reduction in force by discharging those highly
paid specialists already recruited and trained at considerable expense. In-
deed, its ability to recoup is dependent upon their continued availability.
Id. at 1007.
In computing the inventory turnover figure, "cost of operations" was used rather
than the "cost of goods sold." "Cost of goods sold" is a term more appropriate for a
manufacturing or retail business than for a service-related business such as a newspaper.
In any event, the cost of operations for a newspaper is an analogous figure to the cost of
goods sold for a manufacturing or retail concern, and its use here seems appropriate.
The average inventory (or average accounts receivable) is computed by dividing the
annual cost of inventory purchases by two. In Cheyenne the average inventory was ob-
tained by dividing the annual cost of newsprint purchases (which was said to be 15 percent
of the annual operating cost) by two.
The calculations use the average inventory figure rather than the peak period inven-
tory figure because the former is the only one available. In some businesses, however, the
peak period inventory figure is preferable, because
reasonably prudent businessmen, in considering the cash needs of a business
. . . . would take into consideration the fact that the business had peak
periods during the year when cash was tied up in inventory and receivables
for longer periods than usual, and would be justified in accumulating suffi-
cient net liquid assets to meet the needs of the business during this peak
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The facts necessary to calculate the accounts receivable
turnover period were not given in the opinion, but the court did
state that they were collected for the most part every 30 days,
implying an annual turnover rate of 12. This figure expressed as
a decimal is .083.
(c) Operating Cycle expressed in terms of a decimal part





(d) Working Capital = (Annual Operating Expenses +





The figures obtained vary somewhat from those arrived at by
the Tax Court ($310,000 for each tax year). However, a newspaper
is not totally a manufacturing business. It is both a service and a
product industry (that is, it has high fixed costs due to salary
payments). Using the reasoning of the court in Simons-Eastern,
to these figures should be added a certain amount for salary ex-
pense, plus any amount reasonably anticipated by Cheyenne to
be necessary for extraordinary expenses. How much should be
added would come from a more detailed analysis of Cheyenne's
expenses and needs.
The underlying purpose of the Bardahl formula is to provide
a yardstick against which to measure the judgment of the officers
and directors of the corporation in an effort to determine whether
their decision to retain earnings and profits . . . was influenced by
the desire to avoid a second tax on the corporate earnings at the
stockholder level.n
period, rather than just an average operating cycle. [This method] will
distort the picture of the cash needs of this business during most of the time,
but we cannot say that making provision for such a peak period would be
unreasonable or unlikely on the part of the officers and directors of this
corporation in determining the reasonable needs of its business.
Bardahl Int'l Corp., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 935, 945-46 (1966).
2Id. at 944.
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A major attractive feature of the formula method of determining
working capital is its objectivity, and yet "[lt has the advantage
of leaving room for consideration of many variables which may
be applicable to the particular corporate situation which many
so-called rules of thumb do not.""9 Businesses cannot operate in
an uncertain environment. Use of this formula would do much to
inject a little certainty into business decisions with respect to
accumulations of earnings. Determination of working capital
needs based upon the Bardahl formula "would not only go a long
way to dispose of the issues in the instant case but could be useful
to the legal and accounting professions as a future guide."
Utilization of the Bardahl approach in Cheyenne would
probably not have changed the result. The Tax Court noted that
a penalty tax would have been imposed on Cheyenne even if the
court had accepted Cheyenne's $620,000 figure for working capi-
tal. The imposition of the tax would have resulted from the rejec-
tion of Cheyenne's claims for credit for an offset press and for the
development of a Sunday edition. This comment contends that
the Tax Court and the Tenth Circuit erred not in their final
conclusions, but rather in their failure to make a more analytical
scrutiny of the relevant data to determine what would have been
a reasonable accumulation for working capital. The problem in
Cheyenne is the court's failure to articulate its standards for deci-
sion. One is left in the dark as to how the court related and
weighed the various facts before it to arrive at its conclusion. It
is in this situation where the Bardahl approach is superior.
Though the Bardahl formula has been criticized,3' it contin-
ues to be used by some courts. 2 While it may not provide a final
answer in every case, the formula should nonetheless be used as
2Id.
" Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197, 207 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957).
3, Livsey, A Proposed Operating Cycle Test for Sec. 531 Working Capital
Accumulations, 46 TAXES 648 (1968); Monyek, The Growing Problem of Accumulated
Earnings: Section 531 Today, 47 TAxEs 761 (1969).
2 Hardin v. United States, 461 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1972). In Hardin the taxpayer
suggested a formula for working capital similar to that used by the taxpayer and the court
in Cheyenne. The Fifth Circuit said of this formula as compared to the operating cycle
formula:
We need not decide generally whether the operating cycle calculation
successfully urged by the Government is always necessarily preferable to any
other method for determining a corporation's reasonable business needs.
Whatever its merits in the abstract, the Government's approach to the prob-




a starting point in analyzing a company's working capital needs.
In summation, the Tenth Circuit should follow the other circuits
on this question and adopt the Bardahl formula not to sanctify
it, but as the beginning of a detailed analysis of a business' need
for working capital.
Phil McCarty
HI. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL
Weiszmann v. Commissioner
483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1973)
Collateral estoppel is a procedural device which prevents a
litigant from receiving a new decision on the merits of issues
previously decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in a dif-
ferent action between the same parties.' The doctrine, a child of
res judicata,' promotes both the public interest in putting an end
to controversies between the same parties, 3 and the parties' inter-
est that "redundant litigation of . . . identical question[s]" be
avoided.' In Weiszmann v. Commissioner the taxpayer tried for
the second consecutive tax year to deduct as ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses' costs which he incurred attending law
school while working for an oil company in a patent training
program. The Tenth Circuit held that the petitioner was collater-
ally estopped from relitigating the deductability of his legal edu-
cation expenses, regardless of the fact that the taxpayer's job
I RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942) (questions of fact); Scott, Collateral Estop-
pel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942) (questions of fact and questions of law);
Heckman, Collateral Estoppel as the Answer to Multiple Litigation Problems in Federal
Tax Law: Another View of Sunnen and The Evergreens, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 230
(1963) (questions of fact and of mixed law and fact).
2 Scott, supra note 1, at 1-3.
The segregation .of collateral estoppel as a separate concept (from res
judicatal is not a purely academic exercise. Collateral estoppel does not
prevent the second suit's being tried, nor does it bar relitigation of matters
which might have been decided in the first action [as does res judicata],
but only operates to prevent relitigation of those issues of fact or law which
were contested and decided in the first action and which were essential to
the judgment.
Note, Collateral Estoppel as to Questions of Law in Federal Tax Cases, 35 IOWA L. REV.
700, 701 n.1 (1950).
' Scott, supra note 1, at 1, 29.
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598-99 (1948).
5 483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1973), aff'g 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1201 (1972).
, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).
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status had undergone a factual change since the previously-
litigated tax year. The contention is made herein that the court's
application of collateral estoppel to the part of the tax year which
occurred after the change in job status was incorrect, even though
the result reached (nondeductibility) was proper. In order to un-
derstand the criticisms made below, the reader must first under-
stand the nature of the educational expense deduction.
The deductibility of educational expenses requires the reso-
lution of a conflict between provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 which allow deduction, on the one hand, of ordinary
and necessary business expenses,7 and require inclusion, on the
other hand, of personals and capital' expenditures. 10 Because the
statutory sections in question provide so little guidance in the
matter, the applicable treasury regulations "take on added signif-
icance.""
For several tax years prior to 1968, either of two sets of regu-
lations was applicable to determine the deductibility of educa-
tional expenses under section 162(a). Under the old 1958 regula-
tions, a taxpayer could deduct his educational expenses only if
they were undertaken for the primary purpose of either (1) main-
taining or improving skills required in his employment or (2)
,Id.
Id. § 262.
1 Id. § 263(a). Several authors have suggested that professional educational expenses
should be treated as capital expenditures, amortizable against income tax liability over
some useful life. E.g., Heckerling, The Federal Taxation of Legal Education: Past, Pres-
ent, and Proposed, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 117 (1966); McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition Credit
Legislation: Federal Income Tax Allowances for Personal Costs of Higher Education, 61
CALF. L. Rv. 1 (1973). It seems clear that such a privilege would have to be created by
legislative change rather than judicial flat. In D. Bodley, 56 T.C. 1357 (1971), the taxpayer
argued that if his legal education expenses were not currently deductible, he should at
least have been allowed to capitalize and amortize them. The court responded to this
contention simply and succinctly: "There is no legal or factual support for this conten-
tion." Id. at 1362.
1* Heckerling, supra note 9, attributes the origins of this conflict to a statement by
Justice Cardozo in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115-16 (1933):
[A] man conceives the notion that he will be able to practice his vocation
with greater ease and profit if he has an opportunity to enrich his culture
... . Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the goodwill
of an old partnership .... The money spent in acquiring them is well and
wisely spent. It is not an ordinary expense of the operation of the business.
Heckerling, supra note 9, at 120 (emphasis added by Heckerling) (footnote omitted). See
also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1) (1967).
D. Bodley, 56 T.C. 1357, 1359 (1971).




meeting the express requirements of an employer or of an applica-
ble law or regulation for continuing in his position.'3 The expenses
were not deductible if the education was undertaken for the pri-
mary purpose of either (1) obtaining a new or a substantial ad-
vancement in position or (2) fulfilling general educational aspira-
tions."
In 1967,'1 new regulations were promulgated which replaced
the "subjective" test of the 1958 regulations with an "objective"
test of deductibility.'6 Under these now current regulations, edu-
cational expenses are deductible if the education (1) maintains
or improves skills required in the taxpayer's trade or business or
(2) meets the express requirements of the taxpayer's employer, or
an applicable law or regulation." However, educational expenses,
even those meeting the above criteria, are never deductible if the
education either (1) enables the taxpayer "to meet the minimum
educational requirements for qualification in his employment or
other trade or business," or (2) will lead to qualifying the tax-
payer in a new trade or business.'8
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 Cum. BuLL. 63.
" Id. § 1.162-5(b).
's T.D. 6918, 1967-1 CUM. BuLL. 36.
Is Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a), (b) (1967). On the subjective-objective distinction,
compare R. Baum, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 206 (1964) (claims adjuster for insurance
company entitled to deduct law school expenses under 1958 regulations, because his
primary purpose in attending law school was to maintain and improve skills required in
his job) with R. Connelly, Jr., 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 376, afi'd, 1972-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9188 (lst Cir. 1971) (claims adjuster for insurance company not entitled to deduct law
school expenses, regardless of subjective intent, because the education qualified him for
a new trade of business. Baum was stated to have no precedential value because it was
decided under the old regulations.).
I7 Tress. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1967).
Id. § 1.162-5(b)(2), (3). The validity of the 1967 regulations has been challenged
and upheld. Melnik v. United States, 1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9521 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (the
regulations are said to be consistent with the statute and further validity is achieved
through legislative acquiescence); M. Taubman, 60 T.C. 814 (1973); D. Bodley, 56 T.C.
1357 (1971). Some taxpayers have advanced an equal protection argument against the
regulations on the grounds that teachers are treated far more favorably than other groups
(particularly law students). Compare, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(i)(d) (1967) with
id. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), example (2). So far these arguments have been rejected. Weisz-
mann v. Commissioner, 443 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); M. Taubman, supra at
819; J. Lunsford, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 64 (1973); R. Connelly, Jr., 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
376, aff'd, 1972-1 U.S. TAX CAS. 1 9188 (1st Cir. 1971); however, the taxpayer who is willing
to make a sufficient evidentiary showing of discrimination may yet prevail. Compare
Weiszmann, supra; Lunsford, supra; Connelly, supra (1st Cir.'s affirmance), where the
courts rejected the equal protection arguments on the merits, with Taubman, supra; Con-
nelly, supra (T.C. opinion), where the courts withheld judgment on the equal protection
argument pending a case in which a sufficient evidentiary showing was made. In
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In 1968 the Commissioner announced that taxpayers could
rely on either the 1958 or the new regulations in computing their
income tax liability for tax years beginning prior to January 1,
1968.'1 Weiszmann was litigating deductibility of his law school
expenses in tax years 1965 and 1966, and consequently he was
entitled to make this election. 0
Under the 1967 regulations, expenses for legal education are
never deductible, because such education invariably leads to
qualifying the taxpayer in a new trade or business." Under the
1958 regulations the result is not automatic-some taxpayers
have been successful in showing a primary purpose for their law
school education other than obtaining substantial advancement
or meeting general aspirations." However, the majority of the
Taubman, the Tax Court referred to potential future disagreement with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's Weiszmann opinion in stating that it considered the issue unresolved. Supra at 820
n.8.
1 Rev. Rul. 68-191, 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 67.
Furthermore, he was not required to choose one regulation or the other in prosecut-
ing his case before the Tax Court. He was entitled to plead and argue deductibility under
both regulations, and he was entitled to the deduction if he could prove his case under
either. R. Weiszmann, 52 T.C. 1106, 1108 (1969), aff'd, 443 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam).
21 Melnik v. United States, 1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9521 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (IRS agent);
D. Bodley, 56 T.C. 1357 (1971)(electronics teacher/court constable); J. Weiler, 54 T.C. 398
(1970) (IRS agent); L. Bakken, 51 T.C. 603, 607 n.2 (1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.
1971) (weapons research engineer); J. Lunsford, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 64 (1973) (patent
examiner); C. Berry, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 465 (1971) (CPA) (taxpayer was held to be
entitled to the deduction under the 1958 regulations); R. Connelly, Jr., 30 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 376, aff'd, 1972-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9188 (1st Cir. 1971) (insurance claims adjuster).
Possibly an exception to this general rule would arise where the taxpayer enrolled only in
those courses which would be particularly helpful to him in his trade or business, and not
in a full educational program leading to the award of the LL. B. or J.D. degree. Cf. D.
Morrison, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 745 (1970) (taxpayer not entitled to deduct his law school
expenses under 1958 regulations when he could have enrolled only in specific courses
helpful to him in his trade, but instead enrolled in full law school curriculum).
" Welsh v. United States, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964) (IRS agent); Campbell v.
United States, 250 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Penn. 1966) (forensic pathologist); Williams v.
United States, 238 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (IBM patent trainee required to attend
law school as a condition to the retention of his employment). An opposite result was
reached in another case involving taxpayers in the same program, 0. Lamb, 46 T.C. 539
(1966), and the Williams decision was severely criticised in both Lamb and Rombach v.
United States, 440 F.2d 1356, 1361 (Ct. Cl. 1971)); C. Berry, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 465
(1971) (CPA); F. Kilgannon, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 619 (1965) (accountant); M. Schultz,
23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1372 (1964) (IRS agent); W. Charlton, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 420
(1964) (CPA); R. Baum, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 206 (1964) (insurance claims adjuster);
W. Brennan, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1222 (1963) (IRS examiner/reviewer); D. Frazee, 22
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086 (1963) (Air Force "Maintenance Program Control Officer" whose




contests between the government and taxpayers on the deducti-
bility of law school expenses have been decided in favor of the
Commissioner-the taxpayer's primaryl purpose is usually held
to be qualifying for a new trade or business 4 rather than meeting
express requirements of an employer or maintaining or improving
skills.25
2 The requirement of a primary purpose gives rise to the "dual purpose" doctrine.
Marlor v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958), rev'g 27 T.C. 624 (1956) (the dissent-
ing opinion of Judge Raum in the Tax Court decision is adopted in full by the Second
Circuit). In Marlor the petitioner, a college tutor, was said to have two purposes in getting
his advanced degree: (1) it was a requirement for maintaining his position as a teacher;
(2) it was a minimum requirement for appointment to permanent teaching staff. Judge
Raum, dissenting from the Tax Court decision (and subsequently affirmed on appeal),
found that the taxpayer's "much more immediate objective," 27 T.C. at 626, was to retain
his position as a tutor.
The same reasoning was applied in Williams v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 351
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), where the petitioner was an IBM "patent trainee" who was required to
attend law school as a condition to the retention of his employment. The court found that
his primary purpose was to retain his position as a trainee.
The reasoning of Williams was rejected in Rombach v. United States, 440 F.2d 1356
(Ct. Cl. 1971), a case involving a similar patent training program. Rombach distinguished
the patent trainee situation from the Marlor situation on the grounds that a patent trainee
is trying to obtain a new status as a patent attorney, while in Marlor the taxpayer was
simply trying to retain his status as a teacher.
24 Rombach v. United States, 440 F.2d 1356 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (patent chemist required
to attend law school); N. Baker, 51 T.C. 243 (1968) (administrative assistant in construc-
tion business-legal education undertaken "primarily for personal reasons"); 0. Lamb,
46 T.C. 539 (1966) (IBM patent trainee required to attend law school); D. Roeberg, 29
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1007 (1970) (CPA); J. Williams, jr., 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 853 (1970)
(IRS officer); D. Morrison, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 745 (1970) (engineer engaged in some
contract supervisory work); M. Helms, Jr., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1020 (1968) (aeronauti-
cal engineer engaged in some administrative work involving legal matters); J. Martin, Jr.,
24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 982 (1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (peti-
tioner was in law school for 11/2 years before joining Patent Office as a patent examiner;
R. Montgomery, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 599 (1964) (patent searcher required to attend
law school); J. Lezdey, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 485 (1964) (patent "agent"); G. Gulbran-
son, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1022 (1963) (real estate assistant); D. Pfeffer, 22 CCH Tax
Ct. Mei. 785 (1963) (patent liaison); J. Condit, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1306 (1962), aff'd,
329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964) (administrative assistant in construction business); J. Engel,
21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1962) (IRS field agent); R. Hines, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1028 (1961), aff'd sub norm. Sandt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962) (patent
chemist required to attend law school); B. Sandt, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 913 (1961), affd,
Sandt v. Commissioner, supra (patent chemist required to attend law school); L. Aronin,
20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 909 (1961) (NLRB field examiner).
' Some cases turned not on the finding of a bad primary purpose, but rather on the
lack of any qualifying purpose on the part of the taxpayer in undertaking the education.
Huene v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (practicing accountant did not
show sufficient proximate relationship between skills acquired in law school and skills
required in accounting practice); N. Baker, 51 T.C. 243 (1968) (law school education would
be "helpful" to virtually anyone in business-in case of administrative assistant in con-
struction business, legal education was not sufficiently related to required job skills to
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In the initial litigation between Weiszmann and the IRS, R.
Weiszmann,8 the taxpayer contended that he was entitled to
deduct his law school expenses for the tax year 1965. Weiszmann
had taken a job with Marathon Oil Company as a patent trainee
after his 1964 graduation from the Colorado School of Mines.
"His duties were to conduct literature searches in the field of
chemistry, draft patent applications, and prepare amendments
for patent applications for the attorneys of Marathon's patent
department." He was further required to attend law school on a
fulltime basis. It was understood that the position of patent
trainee was a temporary one only. Upon graduation from law
school Weiszmann would become a patent attorney, either stay-
ing with Marathon in such capacity or, more likely, seeking such
employment elsewhere. Marathon's patent attorneys, as opposed
to its patent trainees, worked under little supervision, drafted
contracts, negotiated licenses, and made substantially more
money than did patent trainees. After his graduation from law
school in 1967, Weiszmann took a position with Chevron Research
Company as a patent attorney.
On the issue of deduction under the 1958 regulations, the
court found 0. Lamb28 to be controlling. In that case a patent
trainee for IBM was held not to be entitled to a deduction for legal
education expenses, because he undertook the training program
for the primary purpose of going to law school and becoming a
patent attorney. Similarly, in this case, the court stated:
[Ilt is impossible to conclude that the petitioner expended a great
deal of time and money to obtain a law degree simply for the purpose
of either maintaining his job skills or his position as a patent trainee.
It seems evident to us that his primary purpose was to improve his
position by becoming a patent attorney .... [Tihe petitioner's
primary purpose for undertaking a legal education did not lie in his
desire to continue working for Marathon as a patent trainee.
2'
Thus the court decided that Weiszmann's law school expenses
were not deductible under the 1958 regulations because a patent
trainee would not go to such lengths to maintain or improve his
make the expenses of acquiring the education deductible) (Drennen, J., concurring); A.
Spitaleri, 32 T.C. 988 (1959) (accountant); R. Paulson, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 246 (1970)
(engineer and cost analyst); W. Rylaarsdam, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 707 (1966) ("contract
coordinator").
- 52 T.C. 1106 (1969), aff'd 443 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971).
52 T.C. at 1107.
46 T.C. 539 (1966).
2 52 T.C. at 1109 (emphasis added).
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job skills or to meet the requirements of retaining his job.
Under the 1967 regulations, the taxpayer contended that he
had met the minimum educational requirements for his job as a
"patent professional" when he became a patent trainee. The
court quite properly rejected this argument since law school led
to qualifying the petitioner in a new trade or business-that of a
lawyer °.3 Education which leads one to qualify in a new trade or
business is never deductible under the objective test of the 1967
regulations.
3 '
In the second Weiszmann 31 decision ( Weiszmann I/), the tax-
payer contended that he was entitled to deduct his legal educa-
tion expenses for 1966. The only difference between the previous
tax year and the one in issue was that the petitioner had become
a registered patent agent in May 1966.
A patent agent is a person who has been admitted to practice before
the United States Patent Office. Such admission to practice . . .
requires proof of technical training and experience, and passage of
a requisite examination. A patent agent can represent clients in all
matters before the United States Patent Office.Y
A patent attorney, on the other hand, can represent clients not
only before the Patent Office, but also in legal matters outside the
province of the Patent Office.
34
Citing Commissioner v. Sunnen,5 the Tax Court held that
Weiszmann was collaterally estopped from relitigating the de-
ductibility of his law school expenses for the part of the year prior
to May. However, the petitioner's change of job status in May
changed a "controlling fact" and made collateral estoppel inappl-
icable to the second part of 1966.
On the merits, the court held that, under the reasoning of
Weiszmann I, petitioner was not entitled to a deduction under the
1958 regulations:
Both petitioner and Marathon recognized that petitioner's employ-
ment in either the capacity of patent trainee or patent agent was
only temporary. Once petitioner obtained his law degree he would
See authorities cited note 21 supra.
" The Ninth Circuit's affirmance adds nothing to the opinion of the Tax Court except
for an express rejection of Weiszmann's equal protection argument.
12 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1201 (1972), aff'd, 483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1973).
31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1203; see generally 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.341-48 (1974).
"Id.
" 333 U.S. 591 (1948). See generally text accompanying notes 39-57 infra.
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either become a patent attorney with Marathon or he would seek
such a position elsewhere3
The court clearly felt that a new decision on the merits was re-
quired because of petitioner's change in status from patent
trainee to patent agent. As to deductibility under the 1967 regula-
tions, the court simply noted again that the legal education quali-
fied Weiszmann for a new trade or business.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the result reached by the Tax
Court, but did so in part on different grounds.37 The affirmance
agreed that Weiszmann was collaterally estopped as to the first
part of the tax year, but also felt that he was collaterally estopped
as to the second part:
[Tihe fact that Weiszmann's status changed from patent trainee
to patent agent was not a change which materially altered his status
as a taxpayer insofar as relates [sic] to the deductibility of his legal
education expenses. Whether or not he was a patent trainee or a
patent agent, he nevertheless had as his primary purpose in attend-
ing law school the object of becoming a patent attorney ....
[Tihe relevant facts . . . essential to judgment were "actually liti-
gated and determined in the first tax proceeding," and "the parties
are bound by that determination in a subsequent proceeding..."
Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 . . . (1948). In sum, the relevant
facts in the two proceedings are indistinguishable, the legal issues
therein were identical, and the situation was not altered between the
time of the first judgment and the second. Mr. Weiszmann is there-
fore collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue3
Thus the court indicated its belief that petitioner's change in
status from patent trainee to patent agent was not a significant
change for purposes of collateral estoppel.
The court's application of collateral estoppel to the post-
patent-agent part of tax year 1966 is incorrect for two reasons: (1)
the change in taxpayer's status was a change in a controlling fact
which renders collateral estoppel inapplicable; (2) to apply collat-
eral estoppel in this case is contrary to some well-established
principles governing the application of the doctrine where the
intent of the taxpayer is at issue.
The landmark case in the application of collateral estoppel
to federal income tax issues is Commissioner v. Sunnen,"9 in
31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1205 (emphasis added).
a 483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 819-20.
333 U.S. 591 (1948). The pre-Sunnen history of collateral estoppel in the Supreme
Court can be briefly summarized as follows: In Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351
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which the substantive issue was petitioner's tax liability under
assignment-of-income principles." Sunnen had assigned several
royalty contracts to his wife, who had received substantial
amounts of income therefrom. The Commissioner contended that
Sunnen was taxable on all the income which his wife had received
pursuant to these contracts. In a decision involving an earlier tax
year,4' the Board of Tax Appeals had had one of the assignments
before it (the "1928 agreement") and had held against the Com-
missioner's contention that Sunnen should have been taxed on
the income his wife had earned from the contract. In Sunnen, the
Supreme Court held that the previous decision did not collater-
ally estop the Commissioner from relitigating petitioner's tax lia-
bility on either the 1928 agreement or the non-1928 agreements.
The Court began its opinion by reciting the traditional dis-
tinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel.42 The Court
then focused specifically on federal income tax matters.
(1877), the Court recognized the distinction between res judicata, which operates as a bar
or a merger preventing relitigation of the same cause of action between the same parties
regardless of either party's failure to raise a particular claim or defense in the previous
litigation, and collateral estoppel. The latter bars relitigation only of those issues actually
raised, controverted, and decided between the same parties in a previous litigation. See
Note, supra note 2. In New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U.S. 371 (1897), the Court, in
a state taxation case, held that each tax year presented a new cause of action to which
collateral estoppel, rather than res judicata, was applicable. In the same year the Court
announced that the purpose of the rule was to further "the very object for which civil
courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the
settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the
maintenance of social order." Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897).
Tait v. Western Md. Ry., 289 U.S. 620 (1933), reaffirmed the principle that each tax year
presents a different cause of action, making collateral estoppel rather than res judicata
applicable, and first applied the doctrine to a federal tax case. In Blair v. Commissioner,
300 U.S. 5 (1937), the Court decided that an intervening change in state law (as settled
by a state court decision) was a sufficient change in the "situation" to prevent the opera-
tion of collateral estoppel. Id. at 9.
A more detailed history of the pre-Sunnen case law can be found in Note, supra note
2. See also Heckman, supra note 1.
,0 It has for a long time been well established that a taxpayer can
not avoid the tax on income by assigning the right to receive it without the
transfer of the property from which such right arises.
2 J. MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 18.02 (J. Malone ed. rev. 1967)
(footnote omitted). On assignment-of-income doctrine generally, see id. §§ 18.01-.15.
J. Sunnen, 1935 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 35,211.
" The general rule of res judicata applies to repetitious suits involving
the same cause of action. . . .[W]hen a court of competent jurisdiction has
entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to
the suit and their privies are thereafter bound "not only as to every matter
which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but




These same concepts [of res judicata and collateral estoppel]
are applicable in the federal income tax field. Income taxes are
levied on an annual basis. Each year is the origin of a new liability
and of a separate cause of action. Thus if a claim of liability or non-
liability relating to a particular tax year is litigated, a judgment on
the merits is res judicata as to any subsequent proceeding involving
the same claim and the same tax year. But if the later proceeding
is concerned with a similar or unlike claim relating to a different tax
year, the prior judgment acts as a collateral estoppel only as to those
matters in the second proceeding which were actually presented and
determined in the first suit ...
* * * A taxpayer may secure a judicial determination of a partic-
ular tax matter, a matter which may recur without substantial vari-
ation for some years thereafter. But a subsequent modification of the
significant facts or a change or development in the controlling legal
principles may make that determination obsolete or erroneous, at
least for future purposes. . . .[Collateral estoppel] is designed to
prevent repetitious lawsuits over matters which have once been de-
cided and which have remained substantially static, factually and
legally. It is not meant to create vested rights in decisions that have
become obsolete or erroneous with time, thereby causing inequities
among taxpayers."3
The Court reiterated that collateral estoppel is applicable only
"where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain
unchanged,"" and only where "the second proceeding . . .
involve[s] the same set of events or documents and the same
bundle of legal principles that contributed to the rendering of the
first judgment."45 "[If the relevant facts in the two cases are
separable, even though they be similar or identical, collateral
estoppel does not govern the legal issues which recur in the second
case."" The Court then turned to the agreements at issue.
As to the 1928 agreement, the Court found that there had
been a significant change in the "legal climate"47 governing
assignment-of-income issues since the BTA had rendered its ear-
But where the second action between the same parties is upon a differ-
ent cause or demand, the principle of res judicata is applied much more
narrowly. In this situation, the judgment in the prior action operates as an
estoppel, not as to matters which might have been litigated and determined,
but "only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the
determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered."








Her decision. If the BTA had had the current rules before it when
it rendered its decision, it "might well have produced a different
result."4 This change in legal climate was sufficient to prevent
application of collateral estoppel.' 9
As for the agreements which had not been previously liti-
gated, the Court found that "even though those contracts [were]
identical in all important respects with the 1928 contract . . .
and even though the issue as to those contracts [was] the same
as that raised by the 1928 contract,"50 collateral estoppel was not
applicable. "For income tax purposes, what is decided as to one
contract is not conclusive as to any other contract which is not
then in issue, however similar or identical it may be." 5'
Sunnen holds that where the relevant facts are separable,
collateral estoppel does not apply.5" "Separable" does not mean
distinguishable as to legal relevance, for the Court stated clearly
that even if the non-1928 contracts had been identical to the 1928
agreement, collateral estoppel would still not have been applied.
"Separable" must then mean distinguishable in form, regardless
of substance.
Furthermore, if the Court is to be consistent, "relevant" facts
must be the same as "controlling" facts, for it is changes in such
facts which the Court states to be preclusive of collateral estop-
pel.53 A controlling fact is obviously not a fact which, if changed,
would cause the present court to reach a different verdict on the
merits than did the previous court. If a court must determine the
merits before knowing whether or not to apply the procedural bar
of collateral estoppel, the doctrine serves no useful purpose.' Nei-
ther is a controlling fact properly defined as one which, if altered,
" Id. at 607.
" The concept that collateral estoppel should not apply in tax cases where the law
governing a previous decision undergoes significant change seems to have been first intro-
duced by Griswold, Res Judicata in Federal Tax Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 1320, 1357-58 (1937),
cited with approval in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 602 (1948).
" 333 U.S. at 602.
" Id.
52 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
' Compare text accompanying note 46 supra with text accompanying note 44 supra.
Compare Comment, Res Judicata-Federal Tax Litigation-Collateral Estoppel
Inapplicable After an Intervening Change of Law, 1 STAN. L. Rav. 162 (1948). The author
of the comment contends that the effect of Sunnen is to confine the operation of collateral
estoppel to "cases in which the court would reach the same result without it." Id. at 168.
As a result, "collateral estoppel becomes worse than empty form." Id. The author recom-
mends abolishing the doctrine from application in federal tax cases.
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would definitely have led the previous court to a different result.5
The second court cannot usually be positive of which facts led the
court to reach its result. A controlling fact is correctly defined as
a fact which the second court can say might have altered the
result in the previous case had the fact been changed:
The possibility of a different verdict because of the introduction of
evidentiary facts different from those before a court and jury in a
prior case is sufficient to surmount the danger of collateral estoppel
in an income tax situation. The new evidence need not positively
change the character of the case. It need only change the complexion
of the significant facts presented to the jury.1"
To sum up the rule for purposes of examining the Weiszmann
II opinion, Sunnen held that where a court was presented with an
issue which had previously been litigated between the same par-
ties,57 it could apply the procedural bar of collateral estoppel to
avoid having to make a redetermination of the same issue. How-
ever, if any of the facts which were before the previous court and
which, if changed, might have produced a different result, have
changed so as to be distinguishable in form, then collateral estop-
pel is inapplicable.
In Weiszmann I the issue was the taxpayer's primary purpose
for attending law school-a question of intent. It was inconceiva-
ble to the Tax Court that a person would expend "a great deal of
time and money to obtain a law degree simply for the purpose of
either maintaining his job skills or his position as a patent
trainee.'5 8 In Weiszmann II the taxpayer's status had changed
from patent trainee to patent agent, the latter being entitled to
represent persons in all matters before the United States Patent
Office.5 9 Because the issue and the parties were the same, the
" One must be careful to distinguish between "ultimate" facts and "controlling"
facts. The former are facts upon the occurrence of which the right or duty in question
arises. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944). "Controlling" facts are the
"mediate data," id., "from whose existence may be rationally inferred the existence" of
an ultimate fact. Id. at 928. It is upon ultimate facts that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
operates. Id. It is the similar occurrence of mediate data which gives rise to the doctrine.
See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 F.2d 591, 601 (1948).
m Parker v. Westover, 221 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1955); compare text accompanying
note 48 supra.
"7 No issue with respect to the necessity for a final judgment arises here. Compare
United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953), where the Court held that
collateral estoppel was inapplicable where the previous judgment rested on a "pro forma
acceptance" of the Commissioner's stipulation.
- 52 T.C. 1106, 1109 (1969); text accompanying note 29 supra.
51 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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collateral estoppel issue was properly raised under Sunnen. As to
the part of the tax year before Weiszmann's job status had
changed, collateral estoppel was properly applied. As to the latter
part of the tax year, Weiszmann's change in job status was a
change in fact properly said to be severable-distinguishable in
form.60 Hence the Sunnen exception was applicable if job status
was a "controlling" fact before the first court.
As noted in the quotation above, the first Tax Court decision
was premised on Weiszmann's status as a patent trainee. A
change in that status would not have altered the court's decision
as to the taxpayer's lack of a primary purpose to meet the require-
ments of his employer for retention of his job-whether Weisz-
mann was a patent trainee or a patent agent the job was strictly
temporary. However, it is certainly less "impossible to
conclude" 6' that a person would go to law school to improve his
skills as a patent agent than it is to conclude that he would do so
to improve his skills as a patent trainee. Thus, the change in
status might have affected the court's determination as to Weisz-
mann's primary purpose with respect to maintaining or improv-
ing job skills. Consequently collateral estoppel should not have
been applicable to bar Weiszmann from litigating the deductibil-
ity of his law school expenses.
The only explanation the Tenth Circuit gave for rejecting the
change in facts as a grounds for making collateral estoppel in-
applicable is as follows:
[Tihe fact that Weiszmann's status changed from patent trainee
to patent agent was not a change which materially altered his status
as a taxpayer insofar as relates to the deductibility of his legal edu-
cation expenses. Whether or not he was a patent trainee or a patent
agent, he nevertheless had as his primary purpose in attending law
school the object of becoming a patent attorney .... 2
The first sentence promises a discussion of the "controlling fact"
issue, yet the second sentence resolves the issue by way of conclu-
sion rather than rationale. Worse still the conclusion goes not to
the larger issue of deductibility, but rather applies simply to the
sought-to-be-litigated issue of primary purpose. Thus in reality
the court has not applied collateral estoppel to come to a decision
Cf. R. Weiszmann, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1201, 1203 (1972), aff'd, 483 F.2d 817
(10th Cir. 1973), where the Tax Court carefully distinguished between a patent trainee
and a patent atorney, and a patent agent and a patent attorney.
S, 52 T.C. 1106, 1109 (1969).
62 483 F.2d at 819-20.
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on the petitioner's overall case; to the contrary, it has reached a
decision on the merits with respect to the issue which the tax-
payer sought to litigate. Having reached this decision on the mer-
its, the court then applied the collateral estoppel rule to avoid
having to render a decision on the merits. This non sequitur fol-
lows unavoidably from the court's failure to clearly discern that
a controlling fact is one which might have been determinative
before the prior court, not one which is determinative before the
second court.
Perhaps the Tenth Circuit was taking a different approach.
Perhaps the court meant to say that, for purposes of applying the
1958 regulations, the taxpayer's primary purpose was to be ascer-
tained as of the time he entered law school. The deductibility of
all his law school expenses was to be governed by his intent at
that crucial date. The first Tax Court decision determined that
intent, and subsequent events are irrelevant since they cannot
vary such a determination. Such an interpretation would make
the opinion facially more logical, but would probably also make
the opinion inconsistent with precedent.
Case authorities speaking directly to the issue of when intent
is to be measured for purposes of the educational expense deduc-
tion are conflicting. 3 However, the Tenth Circuit has ruled by
way of inference that even a prior determination of intent to make
a gift could be relitigated if new facts appeared. 4 This is espe-
cially significant since the actual intent involved would never
change-only the evidence tending to establish it would vary.
Proceeding from this opinion, the Tenth Circuit has also ruled
that a finding of lack of intent to create a valid family partner-
ship65 barred relitigation of the same issue unless new facts were
alleged. The conjunction of these cases gives rise to a rule that
63 Compare 0. Lamb, 46 T.C. 539 (1966) (implying intent could change during law
school attendance) and J. Martin, Jr., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 982 (1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d
35 (4th Cir. 1966) (implying intent could change), with R. Jones, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
866 (1970) (stating that the proper time to measure intent is when taxpayer first embarks
upon the course of legal education).
11 Gillespie v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 839
(1946).
a Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), held that the controlling issue
in whether family partnerships would be regarded as valid for federal income tax purposes
was whether or not each member of the purported partnership had a bona fide intent to
be a partner in the business. The opinion did not say specifically when that intent was to
be measured (i.e., upon formation or during each separate tax year).
" Jones v. Trapp, 186 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1950), quoting with approval from Gillespie
v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1945).
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whether a previously-determined intent is static (as in the gift
case) or varies from year to year (as in the family partnership
case), the previous decision will collaterally estop the parties from
relitigating the issue of intent only if no new facts are alleged."7
No circuit has taken the position that would be necessary to
explain the decision reached in Weiszmann //-that once intent
is determined it cannot thereafter be relitigated even if new evi-
dence is produced."8
Thus Weiszmann was entitled to a redetermination of his
intent (his "primary purpose") if he could allege any new facts
having a bearing on that intent." As discussed above, 0 a change
1, Jones v. United States, 466 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973), cited by the court in Weiszmann II as authority, is not to the contrary. Jones
simply held that where the meaning of a contract had been previously determined, the
taxpayer was collaterally estopped from relitigating the meaning of the contract. The only
"new" evidence which the petitioner wanted to produce was (1) evidence which had been
ruled inadmissible at the first trial because improperly presented, and (2) evidence on
which the petitioner had testified at the first trial but which was now more important
because backed up by certain facts. As to the first type of evidence, the court stated that
the taxpayer had had her day in court. As to the second type, the court said that there is
a distinction between new evidence and evidence previously offered which is later entitled
to more weight. The former may bar collateral estoppel, the latter does not. A change of
stress to be placed on facts is not a modification of those facts.
u E.g., Koch v. United States, 457 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1972) (jury verdict that taxpayer
was in the business of selling real estate during certain tax years was relevant to, but not
conclusive of, the same issue in later tax years); Teitelbaum v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d
266 (7th Cir. 1965) (each tax year gives rise to a new issue of intent to carry on a business
as partners to which collateral estoppel is inapplicable); Thomas v. Commissioner, 324
F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1963) (finding that taxpayer intended to operate his farm as a business
in 1955 was not conclusive of the same issue in later tax years); Jackson v. King, 223 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1955) (determination that taxpayer was in the business of selling houses in
1945 was not conclusive of the same intent in 1946 and 1947, because different houses were
involved); Parker v. Westover, 221 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1955) (collateral estoppel inapplica-
ble to previously-determined issue of intent to create a family partnership where, inter
alia, new evidence had become available since the previous trial). Compare Murray v.
United States, 426 F.2d 376 (Ct. Cl. 1970), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973) (taxpayer
contended that he was no longer in the business of selling real estate, although a previous
court decision had established that he was so engaged in business at the time he entered
into the section 453 installment sale in issue. Taxpayer argued that later payments re-
ceived under the installment contract should be treated as capital gains rather than
ordinary income, since he was no longer in the business of selling real estate. The couit
held that his change of business was irrelevant, since section 453 altered only the timing
and not the characterization of the gain. Thus the only important intent was that which
had existed at the time taxpayer entered into the contract). See also Griswold, supra note
49, at 1357.
0 Even if precedent were totally lacking, it would be specious to argue that a tax-
payer's primary purpose with respect to education could not change. The nature of the
deduction is for ordinary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred "during the
taxable year." INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a). The Commissioner chose to define an
educational expense as a business expense if the taxpayer had the requisite intent. Treas.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
in status from patent trainee to patent agent could have had a
substantial bearing on the taxpayer's intent to maintain or im-
prove skills required in his job. Weiszmann was entitled to a
determination of this intent on the merits. Collateral estoppel
was improperly applied to prevent him from receiving such a
decision.
In Weiszmann II an overburdened" court was faced with a
taxpayer who for the second sucessive tax year was trying to
deduct the expenses of his legal education. He raised an issue
which had been dealt with repeatedly by other courts, and which
had been decided adversely to taxpayers in all but one severely-
criticized instance." Understandably but incorrectly the court
collaterally estopped the petitioner from getting a new decision
on the merits with respect to the issue he raised. An appropriate
question is why.
If the court was interested in saving judicial time, it had a
number of other alternatives available to it. A simple adoption
of the well-written Tax Court memorandum opinion would have
sufficed.13 If the court felt that the difference in facts between
Weiszmann I and Weiszmann II was insignificant and the desira-
bility of consistency of decision was great, it could have applied
the doctrine of stare decisis.1' Finally, since it came to a conclu-
Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6291, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 63. To be consistent with the statute, the
regulation must refer to a primary purpose existing "during the taxable year." Surely if
the intent changes from year to year, so does the deduction.
Imagine how chafed the Commissioner would be in the following hypothetical situa-
tion: An IRS agent started law school with the clearly-established single purpose of im-
proving his skills as an IRS agent. This hypothetical agent had stated on innumerable
occasions how despicable he thought lawyers were, and how he would never even think of
becoming one himself. After 6 weeks in law school the agent changed his mind and clearly
demonstrated his intent to become a lawyer. Nevertheless, the Tax Court allows him to
deduct all his educational expenses because he started law school with a proper primary
purpose.
7 Text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
"' See introduction to this issue at 6-8.
7 See authorities cited notes 22 & 24 supra, especially those noted therein as concern-
ing various kinds of patent trainees.
71 Such a procedure was in fact utilized by the court in Glasgow v. Commissioner,
486 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1973) (see Taxation Overview infra at 239 n.5).
71 Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601 (1948) (If controlling facts are severa-
ble, the court may reexamine the issue and either arrive at "a different result, or if
consistency in decision is considered just and desirable, reliance may be placed upon the
ordinary rule of stare decisis."); Journal-Tribune Publ. Co. v. Commissioner, 348 F.2d 266
(8th Cir. 1965) (previous determination of deductibility of business expenses inapplicable
where different purchases were involved-stare decisis invoked in lieu of collateral estop-
pel); Bryan v. United-States, 319 F.2d 880 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (previous decision on the defini-
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sion on the merits anyway,75 the court could easily have written
a brief rationale on the merits as well, drawing from the previous
Weiszmann opinions.
The court's choice to forego these alternatives is disturbing
insofar as it may represent a step away from the well-established
principle that collateral estoppel is to be narrowly applied in tax
cases 76--"collateral estoppel must be used with its limitation
carefully in mind so as to avoid injustice. 7 7 It is contended here
that the court failed to properly so observe the limitations of the
doctrine. Although injustice was avoided in this case-the tax-
payer rightly lost his case-the court may not be so fortunate the
next time it denies a taxpayer the benefit of a fully-reasoned
decision on the merits.
James D. Butler
tion of "property" as applied to taxpayer's lands for purposes of depletion allowance
inapplicable where different lands were involved-stare decisis invoked in lieu of collateral
estoppel).
7' Text accompanying note 62 supra.
o Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948).
7 Trapp v. United States, 177 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 913
(1950); Commissioner v. Texas-Empire Pipe Line Co., 176 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1949).
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